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ABSTRACT 
 Does climate change cause migration, and if so, are areas that host environmental 
migrants more prone to conflict? Using Sudan and Egypt as case studies, this thesis 
examines the effects of climate change on migration and how that influx of people leads, 
or fails to lead, to conflict. This research determines that climate change can, but does not 
necessarily, cause migration, and that environmental migrants can add stress to already 
volatile situations but are unlikely to cause conflict as a sole variable. Despite this 
uncertain linkage between climate change and conflict, it is still important that we take 
actions to address climate change before conditions deteriorate to the point that it 
constitutes a more severe security threat. 
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I. CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION, 
AND CONFLICT 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Climate change is often assumed to generate conflict, but to date no generally-
accepted link has been found. Yet, while climate change may not have a consistent effect, 
it is likely that it has affected some conflicts, but what could be the connection?1 The most 
plausible and widely cited linkage between climate change and conflict has been 
environmental migration.2 The link between environmental migration and conflict is not 
clear, however.3 Scholars, think tanks, and political figures have posited that climate 
change will drive anywhere from 200 million to 1 billion people away from their homes as 
a result of desertification, drought, sea level rise, and temperature increases, but these 
estimates on the level of climate-induced migration are well beyond what has occurred thus 
far.4 While forecasts have been updated, the difficulty in modeling the precise 
characteristics of future climate change and the complex interrelating factors that lead 
people to leave their homes have made projections difficult. As scholars have yet to provide 
consistent results on linkages between climate change, migration, and conflict, these 
connections need to be studied further. With or without conflict, academics largely agree 
that climate change will significantly impact migration going forward.  
Does climate change cause migration and if so, are areas that host environmental 
migrants more prone to conflict? This thesis seeks to examine the effects of climate change 
 
1 Syria and Darfur, among others, have been used as case studies for climate change induced conflict. 
2 Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Climate Change and Conflict,” Political Geography 26, 
no. 6 (2007): 630; Kate Burrows, Patrick. Kinney, and Jan Semenza, “Exploring the Climate Change, 
Migration and Conflict Nexus,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 13, 
no. 4 (March, 2016): 447, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.003. 
3 Rafael Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” Political Geography 
26, no. 6 (2007): 668, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001, 
4 Kate Burrows, Patrick Kinney, and Jan Semenza, “Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and 
Conflict Nexus,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 13, no. 4 (March, 
2016): 448, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph13040443. 
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on migration and how that influx of people leads, or fails to lead, to conflict. To investigate 
how internal migration from environmental changes affects conflict, directly or indirectly, 
in the unstable Middle East, this thesis focuses on the cases of Egypt and Sudan. Sudan 
and Egypt are already facing varying levels of water and food scarcity from diminishing 
replenishable water supplies that have been mismanaged through poor governance and 
adversely affected by climate change. While good governance has the potential to mitigate 
and adapt to scarcity, governments in the region have not lived up to governance standards. 
They have not adapted outside of supply-side fixes, such as desalination facilities, which 
fail to prepare their nations for probable threats associated with climate change.5 When 
governments fail to address these issues, citizens act, and migration has become an 
adaptation technique to help meet resource scarcity demands. Although difficult to isolate 
as an individual factor, this population influx may be a catalyst for conflict due to its 
exacerbation of previous issues in the gaining cities and the pressure that additional people 
add to the mix. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Environmental degradation and resource scarcity are not new phenomena in the 
Middle East. Still, the negative effects of climate change are beginning to intensify, which 
is likely to exacerbate the underlying problems present across the region. With poorly 
governed states prevalent, adaptation and mitigation techniques are ineffective to non-
existent in some states as those states lack the social capital and technical knowledge that 
are required to adequately deal with the challenge.6 Climate change can be seen as a “threat 
multiplier” that will make future conflict more challenging to solve.7 To properly plan and 
prepare for this pending reality, research into how climate change has affected migration 
and how the influx of migrants into existing social structures could lead to conflict is 
 
5 Scott Greenwood, “Water Insecurity, Climate Change and Governance in the Arab World,” Middle 
East Policy 21, no. 2 (June 2014): 141, https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12077. 
6 Jeannie Sowers, Avner Vengosh, and Erika Weinthal, “Climate Change, Water Resources, and the 
Politics of Adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa,” Climatic Change 104, no. 3 (February 2011): 
601, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9835-4. 
7 OECD, “The Outlook for Fragile States,” in Fragile States: Resource Flows and Trends (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2013), 94, https://doi.org/10.1787/ 9789264190399-8-en. 
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needed. With this knowledge, good governance could act as an intervening variable and 
potentially reduce the severity of the threat and prevent conflict. If conflict does occur and 
the international community becomes involved, understanding the root cause will enable 
effective strategies to reestablish peace. 
 Scholars acknowledge the relative importance of climate change but are divided on 
how it will shape potential for conflict. By examining climate change and migration in the 
Middle East, this thesis will delineate how climate change could lead people to migrate and 
how this migration could then develop into conflict. Through understanding this linkage, 
governments will be able to direct aid in such a way as to reduce the friction points that 
precede conflict and help shape how countries are addressing resource scarcity. While 
many scholars have focused on models that forecast how climate change will affect the 
environment, looking at how people react to resource scarcity and environmental 
degradation can help shape concrete solutions to these future problems, however severe 
they may be. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on climate change, migration, and conflict can be broken down into 
two research questions relevant to this thesis: does climate change cause migration and 
does this environmentally-induced migration cause armed conflict? Within the first 
question, whether climate change causes migration, scholars largely agree that it can, but 
it does not necessarily do so in all cases. Those who disagree largely argue that stressors 
from climate change can be adapted to and mitigated by governments and market driven 
technical solutions. Academics differ on the type and amount of migration they anticipate, 
but the majority expect it to be concentrated in urban centers within the state.8  Scholars 
disagree more in the second area of research as to whether environmentally-induced 
migration acts as a key driver of conflict, a minor factor leading to conflict, a factor in 
stressing the resource allocation systems in receiving communities beyond capacity that 
 
8 Burrows, Kinney, and Semenza, “Exploring the Climate Change, Migration and Conflict Nexus,” 
449. 
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could then lead to conflict, or a non-factor that hides the more important conflict generating 
variables of poor governance. These camps will be addressed in the following section. 
1. Climate Change Causes Migration 
One of the earliest and most influential scholars shaping the debate on 
environmental conflict is Thomas Homer-Dixon. Advancing the early work of Malthusian 
scholars that claimed scarcity would lead to conflict as society reached a point beyond 
sustainability of food production, Homer-Dixon looked into the various types of scarcity 
and how people would attempt to respond to them. While focused primarily on conflict, 
his analysis did touch on migration and serves as a starting point for analysis as other 
scholars built off of what he studied. He saw migration as a potential outlet and likely to 
be directed towards urban centers within the nation, as they are the nearest area that people 
can go to have a better chance of addressing their needs.9 Migration then leads to its own 
set of problems, particularly in developing countries with low state capacities. When 
people migrate, the migrants can exacerbate existing social, ethnic, class, or religious 
cleavages in the receiving communities and cause an increased demand on the state for 
water, food, infrastructure, and services. 
Building off Homer-Dixon’s early work, Rafael Reuveny examined climate change 
specifically and how it affects migration and eventually conflict. To forecast how climate 
change will affect migration, he researched how people have responded in the past several 
decades to environmental stressors. People facing challenges associated with climate 
change will stay in place and accept the new status quo, stay in place and adapt, or 
migrate.10 This decision on whether to remain or migrate is dependent on rational analysis 
by those affected as they decide whether migration offers a net benefit larger than 
remaining in place.11 While his analysis focuses on voluntary migration, it leaves out 
instances when people are forced to move due to severe weather events or slow onset events 
that make land untenable due to newly deteriorated conditions. In this, his migration 
 
9 Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, 179. 
10 Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and Violent Conflict,” 657. 
11 Reuveny, 658. 
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analysis assumes that the decision to migrate comes out of a rational choice and excludes 
instances of forced migration. With the addition of these forced migrants to his analysis, 
climate change is even more likely to displace people in the future, particularly in countries 
that are less developed and less able to adapt to the climate changes at the government 
policy level.12  
Similar to Reuveny’s approach, Koko Warner et al. see the same three choices in 
their research but have a different view on the decision making process within those 
choices. They see migration occurring when coping and adaptation strategies fail and thus 
migration is more of a decision of last resort when living situations become untenable.13 
Although it is difficult to isolate the pure environmental push factors, water scarcity is 
likely to be a large driver of this migration as countries under water stress make up one-
third of the world population while having only 8% of the world’s water resources.14 
Continuing the trend of case study analysis to determine the effects of climate 
change on migration, Helen Adams and Susan Kay studied how people have reacted to 
cyclones, hurricanes, and coastal erosion to predict how people will respond to future 
weather events. Adaptation through migration was shown in their research, with family 
members moving to cities in order to send back remittances to cope after weather events.15 
When adaptation was no longer an option due to severe and enduring negative effects from 
disaster, large scale out migration begins to occur, which in turn leads to further migration 
as the sending communities receive positive feedback along with a loss of viability in their 
own community.16 They see climate change increasingly becoming a more important 
driver of migration going forward as conditions worsen. Scott Greenwood used Jordan as 
 
12 Reuveny, 659. 
13 K. Warner, M. Hamza, A. Oliver-Smith, F. Renaud, and A. Julca, “Climate Change, Environmental 
Degradation and Migration,” Natural Hazards 55, no. 3 (December 2010): 691, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11069-009-9419-7. 
14 Warner, Hamza, Oliver-Smith, Renaud, and Julca, 691. 
15 Helen Adams and Susan Kay, “Migration as a Human Affair: Integrating Individual Stress 
Thresholds Into Quantitative Models of Climate Migration,” Environmental Science and Policy 93 (2019): 
130, https://doi.org/10/1016/j.envsci.2018.10.015. 
16 Adams and Kay, 130. 
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a case study and offered unique insights into the linkage as there have yet to be 
environmental migrants in Jordan.17 While migration has not occurred yet, underlying poor 
governance and water scarcity are issues that he sees as likely to worsen if migration does 
occur. As Jordan is a country with weak governance and poorly enforced laws, his study 
shows how government policies can make environmental conditions worse as they fail to 
adequately adapt to deteriorating economic conditions.18  
Many scholars have demonstrated the viability of the link between climate change 
and migration. To further the analysis the World Bank commissioned a report in 2018 to 
understand and prepare for climate change. This report built off the earlier research to 
forecast the likely effects of reduced water availability, reduced crop productivity, rising 
sea levels, storm surges, and extreme weather events. To adapt to these challenges, people 
in affected areas will migrate internally to urban centers, with the poorest countries being 
the worst hit as they are least able to adapt.19 Additional factors in the Middle East will 
make climate change worse as agricultural dominated economies and large demographic 
growth trends make the environmental impacts more severe.20 While they do not see a 
straight line between climate change and migration due to the complexity of the decision 
making process, it is an important factor. Similar to the future looking World Bank report, 
Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal used a model-based approach to determine how 
climate change links to migration. Their modeling showed climate change not acting as 
part of a complex decision making process but more directly forcing migration as a result 
of  the degradation of renewable resources, rising sea levels, and extreme weather events.21 
While some of these events are slow onset, lower developed nations will be less able to 
 
17 Greenwood, “Water Insecurity, Climate Change and Governance in the Arab World,” 151. 
18 Greenwood, 148. 
19 Rigaud, Kanta et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration, (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, 2018.), 4. 
20 Rigaud et al., 78 and 105. 
21 Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, “Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed 
Conflict.” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 676–7, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.005.  
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adapt to these challenges and reduce the eventual environmentally-driven push to 
migrate.22 
As researchers have shown the migration link, policy makers have pushed for 
solutions and proposals, with the 2016 Implications for U.S. National Security Report 
being a prime example. This report forecasts an increase in migration, which will in turn 
lead to competition over limited resources.23 Even if conflict is not generated, migration is 
likely to exacerbate social and political tensions in the receiving areas, which can 
overwhelm governments in weak nations. This forecast is common in policy-making 
circles as an increasing number of politicians and leaders see climate change as a driver of 
migration and conflict.24 To conclude this school of thought views migration as likely to 
occur in response to environmental degradation caused by climate change. The majority of 
that migration is expected to be from rural to urban within a state as those negatively 
affected seek to regain, and/or improve, their standard of living. The timing and level of 
migration varies between scholars as some view it as a process of last resort while others 
see migration as an adaptation technique that will be increasingly used in order to send 
remittances back to the family. As conditions continue to deteriorate, there is largely a 
consensus in this camp that migration will become widespread as affected communities 
lose their viability. 
2. Technical Pursuits Can Prevent the Need for Migration 
Many scholars established a link between climate change induced scarcity and 
migration, but there are some that see migration as an unlikely outcome. As common 
estimates about the vast number of displaced people not coming to pass, this camp has 
some valid critiques. Technical solutions can address climate change induced scarcity, but 
some nations may have an ingenuity gap that prevents them from being able to pursue these 
policies. However, these solutions have mostly been through the use of supply-side fixes, 
 
22 Raleigh and Urdal, 675. 
23 Implications for U.S. National Security of Anticipated Climate Change. Washington, District of 
Columbia: National Intelligence Council, 2016, 6–7. 
24 Nordås and Gleditsch, “Climate Change and Conflict,” 628–9. 
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methods to increase the water supply such as desalination or waste water renewal, that have 
proven to be useful in providing water to nations with depleting supplies. 
Gökçe Günel examines the ability of states, with particular attention to Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to provide water to their citizens in a manner that 
has prevented migration in water scarce regions. These countries suffer from absolute water 
scarcity and yet the state has been able to provide through desalination technology.25 
Multiple iterations of technology have made desalination increasingly efficient and able to 
provide for water-scarce regions. Although this has proven to be an effective short-term 
fix for scarcity that has prevented migration from occurring, there are many issues with 
this approach both presently, and into the future. At present, the creation of water through 
desalination has led to people viewing water as an infinite resource, which has in turn kept 
them from reducing their demand.26 The continued depletion of groundwater aquifers and 
natural fresh water sources make the states even more reliant on desalination going 
forward.27 As countries in the region increasingly turn to desalination and fail to meet 
demand, the excessive use of these facilities will turn the Gulf increasingly saline and less 
effective in producing potable water. There have already been effects in the Gulf of the 
negative aspects of desalination in increased occurrence of red tides.28 Without curtailing 
demand through taxation or water pricing, these issues will be made worse going forward 
and migration could become a possibility where it had not before.29 Government driven 
solutions can work to address scarcity and prevent migration, but they must go beyond 
merely providing additional resources. 
An additional constraint on desalination that Günel mentions is more thoroughly 
shown by Jeannie Sowers, Avner Vengosh, and Erika Weinthal. While technological 
 
25 Gökçe Günel, “The Infinity of Water: Climate Change Adaptation in the Arabian Peninsula,” 
Public Culture 28, no. 2 (May 2016): 292, https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-3427463. 
26Günel, 292. 
27Günel, 295. 
28Günel, 299. Red tides are large concentrations of algae blooms that are caused by changing water 
conditions that have adverse affects on fish and marine plants. 
29Günel, 300–302. 
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solutions have been proposed as an answer to resource scarcity, Middle Eastern 
governments, like many governments in the developing world, lack the social capital and 
technical expertise to adequately deal with the increasing demands of growing populations 
and the stress on resources they engender.30 Oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates can focus on research and development for new desalination 
technologies because of their overwhelming monetary resources. Most other states lack the 
disposable income and knowledge base necessary to pursue these endeavors. The limited 
human, technical, and social capital make market driven solutions difficult to pursue and 
even when achieved, resources tend to go to more privileged groups within society.31 
Additionally, as state-driven adaptation techniques require good governance and popular 
support, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East lack the social contract necessary for 
climate change adaptation.32 States that are unable to direct large sums of money at the 
problem need buy-in and cooperation from their people to address the issue. Here the 
Middle East is at a disadvantage because many governments in the region have relied on 
patronage driven systems that have minimized citizen involvement in government policies. 
Without citizen cooperation, non-oil governments lack the resources and ingenuity to adapt 
successfully. Additionally, for those nations in the region that do not have deep fiscal 
reserves, the money for adaptation would have to come from the international community. 
The stipulations of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans would make long-term 
investments exceedingly difficult to pursue, if viable at all. 
A further complication is the fact that economies that are heavily involved in 
agriculture are more likely to be adversely affected by water scarcity. Even with more 
advanced technical solutions, drought and increasing water and soil salinity make farming 
less viable as a reliable source of income.33 State driven agricultural improvements such 
as waste water renewal and improved irrigation have allowed for less water to be used in 
 
30 Sowers, Vengosh, and Weinthal, “Climate Change, Water Resources, and the Politics of Adaptation 
in the Middle East and North Africa,” 610. 
31 OECD, “The Outlook for Fragile States,” 97. 
32 Sowers, Vengosh, and Weinthal, “Climate Change, Water Resources, and the Politics of Adaptation 
in the Middle East and North Africa,” 601. 
33 Rigaud et al., Groundswell, 78. 
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the economy, leaving more for the direct use of citizens, but states have predominantly 
focused this water supply on urban centers at the expense of the rural citizens.34 Despite 
the agricultural sector using the most water in many nations, crop productivity has 
decreased and led to declining profits.35 With this heavy usage of water, any drought or 
decrease in availability leads to devastating effects on the agricultural community and 
increasingly contributes to pushing farmers out of the profession. The subsequent decrease 
in food production can lead to price increases if governments do not subsidize staple foods. 
With farming becoming a less viable method to pursue a livelihood, this can become a push 
factor for migration away from rural areas to cities. 
Most scholars agree on the linkage between climate change induced scarcity and 
migration, but we have seen there are some who deny this link and point to the ability of 
the markets and governance to address the needs of citizens. While this has proven effective 
for some nations, they face increasing stressors that make their current adaptation 
techniques potentially unable to address scarcity as conditions deteriorate due to climate 
change. 
3. Environmental Migration Can Cause Conflict 
There is a wide variety of literature on the nexus of environmental migration and 
conflict, with the focus of study mainly being on the receiving community. To begin again 
with Homer-Dixon, he identified three types of conflict: simple scarcity, group identity, 
and relative deprivation. Simple scarcity conflict is interstate conflict in an area over finite 
resources as people attempt to seize control of resources essential to human survival.36 
Group identity conflicts deal with the in and out group dynamic created when different 
 
34 Sowers, Vengosh, and Weinthal, “Climate Change, Water Resources, and the Politics of Adaptation 
in the Middle East and North Africa,” 614. 
35 Andy Spiess, “Developing Adaptive Capacity for Responding to Environmental Change in the Arab 
Gulf States: Uncertainties to Linking Ecosystem Conservation, Sustainable Development and Society in 
Authoritarian Rentier Economies,” Global and Planetary Change 64, no. 3 (December 2008): 247, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2008.10.008.  
36 Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” 
International Security 16, no. 2 (October, 1991): 107, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539061. 
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segments of society are competing over resources.37 As environmental migrants rush to 
cities, this group identity dynamic can be created as the previous residents view the new 
arrivals as an out-group that they have to compete with. The relative deprivation conflict 
is created when segments of society see themselves as not getting enough compared to 
other people after the arrival of migrants.38 While conflict could arise from these scenarios, 
he sees the possibility for many factors to break the causal links.39 
Similar to Homer-Dixon, Reuveny sees four possible channels where conflict can 
arise from environmental migration: competition over resources, ethnic tension, distrust, 
and socioeconomic fault lines. Competition conflict arises when the receiving area is 
overburdened by the migrants and the native population has an escalatory competition with 
them for scarce resources.40 Ethnic tension conflict can arise when the migrants are of a 
different ethnic group than the gaining community and they feel threatened as a result.41 
Distrust conflict is more a product of international migration, which is deemed to be less 
likely than internal migration, as the host nation believes the source nation has hostile intent 
in allowing migrants to travel to the new area.42 Finally, socioeconomic fault line conflict 
can arise when rural to urban migration brings agricultural and pastoralists in competition 
with traditional city dwellers who feel threatened by the influx of people from a different 
way of life.43 These four conflict types are not guaranteed to occur, but can be addressed 
by the state, particularly if the flow of migrants is slow as they gradually use migration as 
an adaptation technique to climate change induced scarcity.44 
Separately from categorizing the conflict types, many scholars see the conflict 
potential arising due to a strain on resources in the receiving city as the influx of people 
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helps to create a condition where the previous circumstances can be made worse. Peter 
Gleick explains this dynamic of migration being a “multiplier on social and economic 
pressures already at play.”45 The World Bank report also shows that any existing patterns 
of conflict can be reinforced under climate change stressors, including migration.46 While 
Nordås speaks to the contested nature of the literature, he does point out the linkage of 
environmental migration stressing resources in already resource scarce receiving 
communities and the potential for conflict that this engenders.47 
This body of literature generally agrees on the adverse water trend projections in 
the Middle East, along with other negative effects of climate change, and sees conflict 
potential growing as conditions deteriorate.48 Climate change and migration are unlikely 
to be the primary or only cause of conflict, but they are likely to act in conjunction with 
underlying issues that are present in receiving communities. This makes conflict more 
likely if governments are unable to adequately deal with their needs.49 Importantly for the 
Middle East, climate change may cause more scarcity than governments are able to 
overcome as some governments are weak, but more importantly, they may face extreme 
scenarios that make parts of nations unlivable.50 
4. Environmental Migration Does Not Cause Conflict 
As academics proposed theoretical links between environmental migration and 
conflict, other scholars began to examine the topic to determine the viability of the 
proposed connections. Syria served as the case study for Jan Selby et al. as they examined 
in detail the proposed linkages between climate change and drought, drought and 
environmental migration, and migration and the ensuing civil war that previous scholars 
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had laid out. Their research showed that drought did have an effect on migration in Syria, 
but it was to a much lower degree than that proposed by proponents of the climate-conflict 
nexus.51 Additionally, environmental variables were merely part of the complex decision-
making process that migrants were undertaking as they made the decision to migrate.52 Far 
from being the primary factor for migration, environmental issues help mask the underlying 
poor governance and negative effects of neoliberal reforms that had taken place within the 
nation.53 The next connection they focused on was the migration-conflict link where they 
noted weak evidence that the movement of people acted as a shock to cities that 
overstressed the capability of the state. The conflict that followed was not sparked by 
demands for alleviating the drought or plight of the migrants, but addressing the corrupt 
government that had crushed civil rights, political freedoms, and economic opportunities.54 
Overall, Selby et al. concluded that climate change could be a factor in the conflict but 
claims of its primacy do not stand up to academic scrutiny.55 
Francesca De Châtel also examined the case of Syria and concurred with Selby et 
al. in its possible but minor role. She stresses that in overstating the importance of climate 
change, academics are helping to divert attention away from the main issue that led to the 
conflict; the long-term mismanagement of natural resources.56 There were underlying 
issues that shaped the conflict as well, but focusing on an outside factor removes the central 
responsibility of the Assad regime. Migration from the countryside to the city had been 
occurring as a result of economic reforms in the nation that had stressed the ability of 
farmers to provide for their families and whole families had been migrating to the cities as 
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a result.57 More people did show up at urban camps for the displaced as a result of the 
drought, but the camps had already been in place for over ten years.58 On top of the 
economic reforms, Syria had an “inefficient, corrupt, and rigid water management system” 
that facilitated “large-scale overexploitation of water and land resources.”59 This 
exacerbated poverty and increased migration from the country through rural 
disenfranchisement.60 In her opinion, focusing on climate change is “not only irrelevant; 
it is also an unhelpful distraction” that steers focus away from the underlying issues of poor 
governance, corruption, and economic mismanagement that shaped the conflict.61 
Riley Post et al. see food and water scarcity as just part of the causal chain leading 
to conflict, even with migration as an intervening variable. In attempting to find what 
causes both scarcity and conflict, they see climate change as not necessary or sufficient to 
explain conflict.62 Initial food and water grievances are often compounded by 
governmental mismanagement as rural farmers migrate to cities. As food insecurity is 
significantly linked with weak institutions and faltering economies and the more fragile a 
society is the more susceptible it is to violence, conflict is more of a governance problem 
than a climate change or environmental migration one.63  
Existing circumstances already pose difficulties for governments in the Middle East 
and climate change is very likely to make these underlying issues worse. Depleting 
aquifers, desalination capacity failing to meet rising demand, and agricultural inefficiencies 
that make basic food subsidies more expensive all combine to make urban environmental 
migration a volatile mix and potential source of conflict. With this as a backdrop to climate 
change, and conflict already prevalent in the region, the Middle East will face increasing 
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factors that make conflict more likely. The region may be in a situation where the severity 
of resource scarcity is too difficult to overcome. This thesis will build from existing 
literature to examine whether and how this conflict arises to better understand the potential 
problems of tomorrow. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Rural to urban migration is increasingly becoming an adaptation technique for 
people facing resource scarcity caused by environmental degradation and poor 
governance.64 Other factors are involved in the decision to migrate, but scarcity is a strong 
variable in the decision-making process. Migration from sending areas is likely to increase 
as conditions deteriorate and money being sent home may be unable to provide for the 
needs of the families. This increased migration can create new issues in cities that are 
already poorly governed and create situations where conflict is possible. The main 
hypothesis of this proposal is that conflict is created when large numbers of environmental 
migrants move to cities and overtax the resources to a point that scarcity is created in the 
receiving area. Conflict can be generated in two ways: citizens demand resources from the 
government and are repressed, which leads them to fight back, or the us-versus-them 
dynamic created by an influx of people leads to conflict between groups as they compete 
over limited resources. The alternative hypothesis is that conflict does not result from this 
migration. Whether the government is able to provide additional resources, successfully 
repress the demands of its citizens without violence, or people just live with their situation, 
conflict is avoided because environmental-induced migration does not create conditions 
that engender conflict. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Egypt and Sudan will function as the two case studies in this thesis. Egypt faces 
extreme climate stressors due to sea level rise, desertification, and scarcity, which have 
already driven citizens to migrate within the nation to the Cairo delta area.65 With this 
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internal migration, combined with a recent history of civil strife, government repression, 
and coups, the linkage between migration and conflict in migrant-receiving areas can be 
explored. As Egypt faces multiple adverse effects from climate change, this thesis can 
analyze whether those varied conditions drive migration and conflict more strongly than 
other factors. The linkage between climate change induced scarcity and migration can be 
observed through analysis of data on droughts, rainfall totals, and level of Nile flooding 
into agricultural areas and the ensuing food and/or water scarcity it could cause. If there is 
migration, it can then be compared against previous migration cycles to determine the 
effect climate change had on migration. Next, this research can look at the receiving 
communities and investigate what instances of violence there were and what the nature of 
that violence is.  
Sudan, meanwhile is facing a humanitarian crisis, with overlapping issues related 
to protracted internal conflict and scarcity-induced migration.66 As such, Sudan poses a 
contrast to Egypt in the case study analysis, as it exhibits more severe and prolonged 
violence that can be broken down over multiple iterations to analyze the most important 
causal factors. With both localized and more general conflict, Sudan offers a wealth of 
opportunity to study the relationship between migration and conflict. Climate data will be 
used to determine the extent that climate change has adversely affected the environment in 
the two nations, with NGOs providing data on the levels of internal migration resulting 
from scarcity and climate-induced stressors. Analyzing the varied government responses 
to migration will help determine whether and how conflict is mitigated by policy and if 
scarcity can be overcome before it leads to conflict. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized into four chapters. The next chapter analyzes the specific 
dynamics of climate change in driving migration in Egypt and if that migration has caused 
conflict. The third chapter investigates the same dynamics, but focuses on Sudan, which 
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has seen more consistent environmental migration and conflict. Finally, the fourth chapter 
will bring the results of the previous chapters together to compile lessons learned and 
analyze projected climate change and its influence on future population movement. This 
chapter will conclude with analysis of policy options for adaptation and mitigation that can 
reduce the adverse effects that climate change can create. 
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II. THE CASE OF EGYPT 
“The frustrations of living in Cairo and other Egyptian cities increase daily. 
This is a function of population explosion, of urban migration, and of an 
infrastructure which was sorely neglected for 25 years. … Cairo’s water, 
sewage, transportation, and telecommunications are all woefully 
inadequate.”  
—1979 State Department Memo67 
“What will happen when there are 70 million of us, keeping in mind that 
resources do not increase at the same rate as population? … What about 
houses, food, education, medical treatment, and many other needs for 
[these] millions? Where will we get these things?”  
—Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak 198868 
“Egypt with 20 million people could have been a Mediterranean country, a 
Greece or Portugal. Egypt with 70 million people will be Bangladesh”  
—Former Minister Boutros-Ghali69 
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The most populous nation in the Middle East, Egypt offers an interesting case study 
for analysis on the nexus between climate change and migration and between migration 
and conflict. While most scholarship on the issue has looked at conflict and then analyzed 
the effects of environmental migration, Egypt provides a counterpoint. By not attempting 
to directly prove or disprove the linkage and merely studying a nation that is undergoing 
climate change, the case of Egypt can provide unique insights into how and why people 
decide to move and the effects that climate change has on such decisions. Absence of 
 
67 Gerasimos Tsourapas, Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt: Strategies for Regime Survival in 
Autocracies, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 165. 
68 Tsourapas, 163. 
69 Tsourapas, 168. 
 20 
movement can provide takeaways on what led people to not migrate as the literature 
suggests they should. 
In Egypt, a growing population, limited natural resources, and overburdened urban 
systems are interlinked challenges that are likely to be exacerbated by climate change.70 
This chapter analyzes the underlying pressures of demographic change and urbanization, 
water scarcity and overreliance on the Nile, reduced agricultural productivity, and a history 
of government inaction and policy failures. Current effects of climate change in Egypt are 
then explored and likely future impacts discussed. Next, the levels of migration in Egypt 
are examined in three levels: intrastate migration, emigration, and outside refugee flows 
through the state. Finally, I investigate the linkage between this migration and conflict. 
This analysis concludes that while climate change has some effect on migration, and strong 
effects on Egypt going forward, the levels of internal migration are currently too low to 
create conflict as the literature suggests. 
B. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND URBANIZATION 
Egypt is the most populous nation in the Middle East with official totals surpassing 
100 million citizens as of February 2020.71 Despite this large population, Egyptians are 
forced to live almost entirely along the borders of the Nile River and into the Delta region. 
This area is about 40,000 km2 and is also where the arable land is found.72 The rest of the 
nation is largely desert and this leaves 96% of the population living in an area between 4% 
and 6% of the total landmass. The recent rise in land being used for development and 
housing has been a result of the rapid urbanization occurring around Cairo and Alexandria 
where some estimates have now put the total land usage between 6% and 7%.73 As a result 
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of this, approximately half of Egyptians live in urban areas centered around Cairo, 
Alexandria, and the Nile Delta.74 
The population in Egypt is not only large and concentrated, but it is growing. Just 
three years ago population estimates were in the low 90 millions with a growth rate of 2% 
per year projected.75 Predictions for the future vary but all show continued growth. From 
one million additional Egyptians per year to a doubling of the population over the next 50 
years, Egypt will only become more populous and face increased density in the already 
burdened urban areas.76 Density in the Nile Delta is already beyond 1,600 people per km2 
and the United Nations is predicting severe water and energy shortages as soon as 2025.77  
This population boom is not coming from immigration, but a large rise in the 
younger generation, which has created a youth bulge. Over 54% of the populace is under 
24 years old.78 With the population already concentrated in the cities, this demographic is 
further fueling overpopulation and a reduction of state ability to provide basic services. 
This lack of access to basic services has created a sense of relative deprivation in the youth, 
which poses a current and future challenge for the Egyptian regime as it has the capability 
to erode the social contract.79 Additionally, large youth populations increase the risk of 
violence in semi-democratic and transitional regimes, categorizations that accurately 
describe the political situation in Egypt today.80 Another issue from this rising population 
is the negative impact on housing in urban areas. More young people are living in informal 
settlements and other marginal housing developments that directly put them at a higher risk 
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for natural hazards and disasters.81  These settlements are the most likely to be negatively 
impacted by climate change due to their impermanent and substandard nature. They also 
lack proper water and sewage services. This puts the youth at a higher risk of negative 
impacts from climate change.82 
The final issue within this changing urban environment and youth bulge is the rise 
of the informal labor market that has occurred simultaneously. The large informal economy 
is estimated to be between 48% and 70% of the total economy and approximately 61% of 
GDP.83 This has been fueled by migrants to cities and the rising youth population that are 
unable to find jobs and turn to this alternative economy. Youth unemployment has risen 
from 25% in 2010 to over 37% in 2014, with the more educated having higher 
unemployment rates than the lesser educated.84 Estimates now put youth unemployment 
between 30% and 40% and with approximately 800,000 new entrants into the labor market 
every year, it is likely to become even worse.85 Adding to this is the phenomenon of labor 
shortages in certain sectors of the economy as skilled workers often go abroad for higher 
pay and remaining workers lack the necessary skills for available jobs.86 As the 
government attempts to address these issues, economic growth is threatening the quantity 
and quality of water resources and demands will only increase.87 
C. WATER SCARCE NATION AND RELIANCE ON THE NILE 
The Nile River is the very lifeblood of Egypt. It supplies 97% of Egypt’s water and 
with precipitation incredibly low in the highly populated lower Nile Basin and Delta, it is 
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essential for providing the water needs for Egyptians.88 There has been an illusion of 
abundance with little awareness or political desire to plan for alternative water sources with 
such a major river within the state.89 Despite this illusion, reality is harsh. Egyptians 
receive approximately 700 m3 of water, one of the world’s lowest per capita water shares, 
and well below the average of approximately 1000 m3.90 Additionally, the Nile River Basin 
is considered closed as all of the renewable flows are being used to meet human demands 
and freshwater withdrawals from the Nile are at 94% of the renewable rate.91 In addition 
to being below the standard level, water managers typically view annual water availability 
of less than 1,700 m3 as a significant constraint on socioeconomic development; 
development that is necessary in Egypt.92 
Reliance on the Nile puts Egypt at risk to any negative impact on the river, whether 
that be natural or man made. The World Bank predicts that unmet water demand could 
increase 11 fold in Egypt by 2050 as population increase accounts for 4/5 of the total and 
the remainder a result of climate change.93 Adding to this strain is the uneven distribution 
and mismanagement of the water supply as rural areas receive significantly less water 
services than those in the cities.94 Access to clean water was one of multiple issues that 
youth labeled as their gravest concerns leading to the Arab Spring demonstrations in 
Egypt.95 Separately, as the Nile is becoming overtaxed, aquifers that Egypt could turn to 
that cross national borders are being overexploited by Libya, which further constrains 
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alternative water sources.96 Regardless of cross-border issues or climate change reducing 
the flow of the Nile, the rapid population rise in Egypt will likely dramatically increase 
demand on water supply and government services.97 
The final key factor regarding reliance on the Nile is the nearly complete Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the geopolitical tensions that have arisen between 
Egypt and Ethiopia because of it. Egypt has long considered the Nile its purview and 
upstream nations were supposed to comply with whatever demands Egypt had on 
management of the river. Ethiopia has become a stronger player as they developed vis-à-
vis Egypt with Nile river management and the GERD as the strongest expression of this. 
Egypt has the Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser, but the GERD will become the largest 
dam on the Nile and potentially reduce the flow by up to 25% while also reducing the 
electricity generating potential at Aswan.98 The speed that Ethiopia uses in filling the dam 
is key to the negative impacts on Egypt as the lake will be approximately the size of London 
and severely reduce downstream flow if filled up quickly.99 Sudan is in between the two 
nations and has traditionally sided with Egypt, but as they stand to benefit from the GERD, 
they are siding with Ethiopia. There have been multiple iterations of international talks on 
the dam brokered by the United States and World Bank that have failed.100 Any reduction 
in flow could be very detrimental to Egypt due to their overreliance on the Nile and their 
near maximum use of the resource. The political fight continues, but Ethiopia has pressed 
forward with the dam construction. Political dynamics aside, hydrologists emphasize that 
the most pressing issue is not the dam, but population growth and climate change.101 One 
proposed solution for Egypt’s water demands is to reduce their agricultural production and 
transition to another industry. This would reduce the amount of water necessary for 
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agriculture, but it would make Egypt even more reliant on other nations for food imports, 
which is politically untenable.102 As President El-Sisi has said, “The Nile is a question of 
life, a matter of existence to Egypt.”103 The importance of the Nile will remain paramount 
to Egypt going forward. 
D. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Overpopulation and reliance on the Nile carry directly over to the third underlying 
condition in Egypt, decreased agricultural productivity. With a rising population and a 
finite living area, there is competition over whether to use that area for urban development 
and housing or for agriculture and food production.104 This competition is not only for 
space, but also for water usage. Farmers have to decide on whether to produce staple foods 
for domestic consumption or more high-value, water-intensive crops that can be sold 
abroad. As only 4% of Egypt is suitable for agriculture, a rising population curtails both 
the capacity to provide for citizens and competes with their basic service requirements.105 
Egyptian scholars estimate that agricultural production needs to increase by 70% in order 
to keep pace with the population, a task that is increasingly difficult as agricultural land is 
lost in the face of urban expansion.106 Agriculture is so important in Egypt that it is listed 
as a basic component of the national economy in the 2014 constitution with 20% to 30% 
of the population employed in the industry.107 Despite this importance, neoliberal reforms 
from the 1980s onwards have created inefficiencies in the sector with inequalities and 
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polarization sharpening since their enactment.108 The competition over land use for 
agriculture versus development is one that comes with no winners. 
In order to combat the issue of limited agricultural area, Egypt imports a high 
volume of staple crops, such as wheat, from the global market. A common factor scholars 
look into as one of the drivers of the Arab Spring protests in Egypt was the shock to the 
global wheat market in 2010–2011 that had negative repercussions for Egyptians reliant on 
those imports.109 Nations attempted to purchase available wheat which drove up prices 
and reduced global supply. The ensuring decreased supply caused widespread anger in 
Egypt despite the government spending 3% of GDP on wheat subsidies to cushion price 
effects.110 Urban citizens were affected as they do not produce food, but even in the rural 
areas where agriculture is predominant, nearly 70% are poor and food insecure with 
farming unable to function as their main source of income or provide enough food for their 
families.111 The possible solution of importing more food from abroad to counter the 
effects of the GERD seem unlikely with these recent negative effects on the food supply 
still within memory. 
Aside from the direct competition for land use, farmers also must face the issue of 
lack of water availability for agricultural endeavors. Farming consumes 85% of the water 
total used by Egypt.112 President El-Sisi has attempted to curtail this by imposing 
restrictions on water intensive crops like rice and bananas, but even with this the water 
demand is still high.113 The Nile Delta has historically provided approximately 60% of the 
country’s food production requirements, but with the increasing demands on the Nile they 
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are not getting the necessary amount of water for their crops to produce.114 The Delta is 
not alone in this as the southern province of Minya has also seen productivity decreases 
due to water shortages.115 These shortages are expected to become worse as the increased 
population demands more water and the GERD reduces the supply. This scarcity has driven 
farmers to create illegal wells that further reduce the water supply downstream. They also 
cause soil erosion and farmers continue to grow water intensive crops for export.116 
Limited water supply is here to stay in Egypt. 
The final agricultural problem is the overly saline soil. In order to provide for the 
ever-growing population, farmers crop the land two to three times per year and are aided 
in this endeavor by extensive irrigation.117 This overexploitation of the land has led to soil 
waterlogging, drainage issues, and increased salinity that has reduced crop productivity.118 
Productivity reduction continues and gets worse the more the land is used. To further 
exacerbate the problem, the highly saline soil in the Nile Delta region is also made more 
saline by its proximity to the Mediterranean Sea and seawater intrusion.119 Agricultural 
productivity is decreasing just as Egypt needs it to exponentially grow. 
E. HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT INACTION AND POLICY FAILURES 
The issues Egypt faces are difficult to combat, and yet doing anything would largely 
be an improvement over the actions Egyptian leaders have taken until recently. Climate 
change is beginning to affect the world more, but Egypt has faced it with inaction and 
avoidance. The topic was shunned in politics.120 Further, the state does not see 
environmental induced migration as a concern and has instead focused on migration in 
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general from a policy perspective; neglecting important environmental factors.121 By not 
focusing on these issues, the government is failing to adopt policies, like desalination and 
shifting agricultural policies, that could reduce the negative effects of climate change and 
mitigate the issues that are already in place. On top of the inaction, there is strong evidence 
that Egypt has severely mismanaged their water resources. This has led to water and food 
insecurities along with environmental threats as distribution networks fail to reach all 
citizens.122 Even when actions are taken, the rampant corruption in the political system 
makes any proposed reforms unlikely to have the desired benefits.123 
Unequal water distribution is one mismanagement issue in Egypt. The wealthy are 
more likely to have reliable, clean water while the urban and rural poor face unstable water 
access. They often have to pay high prices to private suppliers merely to get low quality 
water.124 This unequal distribution has led to insecurity and shortages, with those already 
in the most precarious situations facing the negative effects.125 Previously, after the 
privatization of water supplies in the early 2000s, protests sprouted up as people faced even 
worse conditions in water access.126 With water availability expected to decrease, the 
competition over limited resources is likely to increase as citizens try to provide for their 
basic needs. Tensions could arise along socioeconomic lines as the lower classes are unable 
to meet these base requirements.127 Governments can address these issues, but it requires 
proactive work and planning, planning that is not happening in Egypt. 
Inaction is a common reaction to the effects of climate change, but Egypt also has 
pursued policies to counter their demographic and agricultural challenges; policies that 
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further exacerbate water scarcity in the nation. As previous agricultural land is encroached 
upon for urban development, the government has tried to promote agricultural expansion 
into the desert.128 This expansion into the desert will require even more water than their 
overburdened system can handle. Crop productivity is decreasing in traditional farmland 
and expanding into an arid desert is unlikely to provide much benefit. President El-Sisi is 
also building a new administrative capital in the desert outside of Cairo that will require 
additional water servicing.129 Expanding into desert areas for agriculture and urban 
development are policies the government is pursuing, but this fails to account for the 
increased water demand these policies will engender.  
There have also been resettlement efforts with citizens moving to the Sinai 
Peninsula to decrease the demand on services in Cairo, but this has faced challenges of its 
own. The newcomers have been at odds with the Bedouin that inhabit the area. Issues over 
land rights, access to services, and natural resource management have all come to the fore 
as the newcomers are benefitting at the expense of the previous inhabitants.130 In a nation 
that is largely desert, options for expansion are all problematic, from a water management 
standpoint. 
Finally, the Aswan High Dam has created issues for Egypt while also providing 
necessary power generation. Finished in 1965, it was intended to release Nile water year 
round instead of just the summer flood season, but Lake Nasser loses between 12% and 
14% of its water from evaporation and seepage each year.131 This dam also prevents 
sediment from reaching the Nile Delta, which stops coastal replenishment as climate 
change is making this erosion worse.132 Not all Egyptian policies are bad, though, as 
President El-Sisi has begun to take active measures to address the water supply needs for 
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Egypt. The government has begun to build desalination plants along the Red Sea and 
Mediterranean coast. These facilities provide additional water while preventing the water 
loss and inefficiencies inherent in transferring water from the Nile to periphery areas.133 
This is part of a 20 year water management scheme with plans to spend over 50 billion 
USD on desalination plants and more efficient irrigation schemes.134  
To sum up, the underlying water issues in Egypt are many, but some policies are 
being undertaken to address them. However, the concerns are that this may be too little and 
too late. 
F. CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS 
Egypt is particularly vulnerable to climate change with their dependence on the 
Nile, large agricultural base, and long coastline susceptible to sea level rise,. Indeed, the 
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) lists the Nile Delta as 
one of the most vulnerable areas on Earth for climate change.135 As a vulnerable and poorly 
governed state, Egypt is likely to face complex and difficult problems associated with 
climate change. The less than perfect political environment makes mitigation and 
adaptation measures more difficult to pursue.136 The primary climate change challenges 
facing Egypt are sea level rise, decreased and unpredictable Nile flow, and desert 
reclamation and expansion. 
The most pressing climate change effect in Egypt, and the reason behind the IPCC’s 
vulnerability assessment, is sea level rise that causes coastal erosion and increases soil 
salinity in the Delta. This densely populated area is less than two meters above sea level 
and is protected by a coastal sand belt that has been eroding at an accelerated rate because 
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of the Aswan Dam.137 This can be countered somewhat with dikes, but that will only curtail 
the worst of the flooding while increasing groundwater salination and spoiling fertile 
agricultural land.138 Projected sea level rise in the area could reach 10% to 12% of the low 
lying basin area.139 Theoretical future problems are one thing, but Egypt is facing current 
issues from sea level rise in the Mediterranean. Alexandria, the second most populous city 
in Egypt, has seen an increase in flooding with serious floods in 2015, 2017, and 2018 
resulting in millions of dollars in lost revenue.140 Temperatures have also been rising with 
the four hottest years on record occurring since 2000. Temperature increases expand the 
Mediterranean and also makes crops less productive and require more water.141 These 
increases also intensify the evaporation of water supplies and Alexandria is increasingly 
forced to deplete its underground aquifers, which in turn allows seawater intrusion.142 The 
problems are compounding and only getting worse. 
It is not just the climate in Egypt that is important for their water supply but the 
source areas for the Nile River too.143 The Ethiopian Highlands provide nearly 86% of the 
total water for the Nile and this is seasonally driven as most of the rain comes from highly 
variable, monsoon driven rains.144 Increasingly common severe weather events in the 
Indian Ocean basin make droughts and extreme monsoon seasons become more likely.145 
Excess rain could be beneficial to Egypt, but it also poses the risk of increased flooding 
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into populated areas that the Aswan High Dam would be unable to regulate. Droughts pose 
obvious challenges. Beyond strategic competition over the GERD, Egypt is reliant upon 
the rain seasons that occur in upstream nations. 
The final climate change effect on Egypt is the spread of the Western Desert that 
makes up almost a third of Egypt. President El-Sisi has attempted to expand agriculture 
and development into the desert, but the dunes are pushing back.146 Dunes are advancing 
between 7.5 and 9.1 meters per year towards both newly established settlements and 
traditional oases because of extreme drought and lack of vegetation in the desert.147 
Encroachment on new territory is bad enough, but the desert is also gaining ground on the 
western side of the Nile valley.148 As conditions become hotter and dryer in Egypt, the 
spread of the desert becomes easier and more of a negative factor that the government has 
to face. Climate change effects are present in Egypt now and are likely to worsen going 
into the future. 
G. SO, IS MIGRATION PRESENT? 
Climate change presents myriad challenges in Egypt, alongside multiple underlying 
domestic concerns, and the literature would tend to presume that migration would be 
present as a coping method. Despite this, internal migration rates in Egypt are low; an 
estimated 8% with the world average being 15%.149 There are many proposed reasons for 
this, including that less-educated citizens are unable to gain employment if they migrate, 
labor is tied up in agriculture that they can not leave, rural poor produce food that helps to 
offset soaring food prices they would face in the city, family support networks help enough 
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to survive in the home area, cities lack affordable housing, and  the general inability to fund 
migration unless a job is secured beforehand.150 When the risks of migration are high and 
the situation at home is livable, Egyptians have tended to stay in place. Older generations 
also view leaving the land to look for work in cities as shameful, but the younger generation 
are open to it only if they are able to avoid migration’s challenges.151 Rich Egyptians have 
been successful in emigrating to North America, Europe, and Australia but for average 
Egyptians, the only option is to remain and endure inflation, unemployment, and increased 
environmental risks.152 This section will examine Egyptian migration in three levels: 
internal movement, emigration, and the additional flow of refugees in the country. 
1. Internal Migration 
Internal migration data is difficult to accurately ascertain due to population density, 
the nature of circular and seasonal migration, and government inattention to the issue.153 
However, scholars have been able to piece together data in order to generate an 
understanding of the nature of migration in Egypt. Perhaps the most salient data is based 
on looking at the annual percentage of population residing in urban areas. A growing 
population that underwent significant migration would have an increasing rate of 
urbanization as people moved to urban areas, but Egypt has seen a less than 0.5% change 
in urban population total since 1980.154 Of the small amount of internal migration present, 
it is primarily urban to urban, with rural to urban the next highest total.155 Opportunities 
and areas to move to are limited as overpopulation and unemployment are ever-present 
challenges because of the extreme population density in Egypt.  
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The internal migration that does occur in Egypt is generally directed towards the 
highly-populated Cairo area and canal governates.156 Approximately 61% of migrants in 
cities come from other urban areas and the peak movement period for Egyptians is from 
20–25 years old.157 Those Egyptians that do move from rural areas tend to be more 
educated and earn higher wages than other workers in gaining communities.158 Despite 
this, the severe overpopulation leads to residential segregation and migrants tend to be 
forced into inadequate slum housing.159 New housing developments have been proposed 
in the past, but are often viewed as unrealistic due to the already high levels of population 
density and prevalence of informal settlements.160 Not only are there challenges in making 
the decision to migrate, but for those that wish to the lack of available housing and services 
in cities further restrict its usefulness. 
Many factors drive people to migrate, and the ranking of environmental push 
factors is difficult to assess. Some academics in Egypt that study migration claim that 
environmental degradation has no impact on migration and that the key drivers are 
unemployment and poverty.161 However, others see environmental factors as the 
underlying reason that causes poverty amongst the rural population and that is why they 
migrate.162 Factors that prevent environmental challenges from causing migration include 
land ownership and lack of financial means to move. Many rural Egyptians are unwilling 
to leave land that they own, even if it is unproductive. For those that have the desire to 
move to the city, the fiscal reality of selling their land and moving often prevents them 
from having a viable path to migrate.163 Egyptians have still largely remained in place and 
not turned to migration as an adaptation technique or coping mechanism despite the 
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severity of the climate change threat working in conjunction with other systemic 
challenges. 
2. Emigration 
Internal migration in Egypt may be low, but that is partly due to government 
policies that have allowed for nearly unencumbered ability to pursue temporary labor 
emigration. Egypt is the largest provider of migrant labor in the Middle East with over six 
million dispersed throughout the region and a further three million abroad in Europe, 
America, and Australia as of 2016.164 This was not a purely natural process, but a policy 
developed by the Egyptian government to create a safety valve for excess labor and to 
prevent issues of overpopulation and unemployment from destabilizing the regime.165 
During the Nasser period, education was expanded and Egyptians were promised state 
sponsored jobs at the completion of their schooling.166Tthis policy created a surplus of 
educated workers and the government did not have the ability to employ all of them. The 
regime, from the 1970s onward, instituted a policy of unencumbered emigration to Middle 
Eastern nations that removed excess workers from the domestic market, provided 
remittances, and allowed for more effective control of the remaining citizenry.167  
As part of this policy, Egypt abandoned efforts to keep track of emigration so they 
could overestimate the total to the citizenry to incentivize labor emigration. Meanwhile, 
they could also downplay the number to foreign leaders to prevent any insecurity arising 
from this mass flow of people.168 This policy even reached the 1971 permanent 
constitution where emigration was broken down into permanent and temporary, with 
temporary workers being those working in neighboring Arab nations regardless of the 
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duration of their stay.169 With Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations having the world’s 
highest immigration rates, Egypt was able to supply this necessary labor while preventing 
issues from arising domestically.170 
An important part of this program was the continued transmission of remittances 
back to Egypt. Egypt receives the largest amount of remittances in the region with 20 
billion USD being sent back in 2017.171 This serves as a key source of income and, as 
money transfers can be done unofficially, this total may be even higher than the official 
numbers.172 The ability of the state to export their labor, remove the need to provide 
services to portions of their citizenry, alleviate urban overpopulation, and gain remittances 
in the process made this policy a success. With remittances making up at least 6% of GDP, 
this policy was effective on multiple levels.173  
The policy has been facing strain in recent years, despite its temporary success. 
There has been a steady fall in the recruitment of Egyptian labor as GCC nations have 
increasingly turned to South Asian migrant labor.174 The fall of Gaddafi in Libya and the 
ensuing instability also caused a mass influx of return migrants to Egypt and overwhelmed 
their capability to support them.175 This return of labor has further burdened the domestic 
job market and made the economic situation more dire as some young Egyptians are now 
attempting to reach Europe through unofficial paths across the Mediterranean.176 Wealthy 
Egyptians are able to legally migrate to Western nations, and there has been an increase in 
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international mobility for this group since 2011, but this is not an option for most 
Egyptians.177  
Egypt is now facing more domestic tension as regional migration opportunities 
have diminished,. According to a Gallup Potential Net Migration Index poll, if all Egyptian 
adults who wanted to emigrate could do so, the population of Egypt would decline by 20–
30%178 Even if they could leave, however, Egypt would still face environmental 
challenges that make the underlying conditions worse.  
3. Refugee and Other Flows 
Separately from the movement of Egyptians, international migration and refugee 
flows through Egypt add complications to the already troubled nation. Egypt is a source, 
destination, and transit country for migration with over 250,000 refugees currently residing 
in the overpopulated city of Cairo and in urban areas of the Nile Basin.179 It is traditionally 
more of a transit nation with refugees intending to continue across the Mediterranean to 
Europe, but refugees are increasingly using Egypt as a final destination due to their inability 
to travel further.180 Egypt has attempted to make it hard on refugees to force their 
continued transit through police violence, irregular detentions and killings, and nationalist 
xenophobia that acts as a palliative for domestic issues but this has not stopped the trend.181 
As refugees live in urban areas and not camps, they further overload the national safety net 
shared with Egyptian citizens. Refugee communities compete with Egyptians in the 
informal labor market that they have been increasingly forced to turn to as a result of the 
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failures of the economy.182 The United Nations High Commission on Refugees provides 
unconditional cash assistance to these refugees, with funds ranging from EGP 600–1,800 
that covers approximately 30% of basic needs.183 This is another source of tension as 
Egyptians are not given this assistance and their government is unable to provide for the 
booming population. 
4. Does That Migration Create Conflict? 
In the leadup and aftermath of the Arab Spring, there were widespread protests from 
farmers that were facing water scarcity, across the Nile Delta and through the Upper Nile 
region.184 The states of Ismailia, Fayoum, Minya, Dakahlia, and Sharqia saw farmers 
gathering to protest water scarcity that prevented necessary irrigation, forcing some 
farmers to turn to sewage water and others to lose their limited cultivatable land.185 
Additionally, farmers were protesting against the ability of the wealthy and politically 
connected to get water while they could not get what they needed. These protests’ intensity 
has declined, but they continue today, as lack of water access and scarcity have not gone 
away. Rural leaders must continue to settle disputes between farmers as they compete over 
irrigation access.186  
These protests were not caused by migration, since Egypt experiences very little 
urban-to-rural or rural-to-rural migration. However, as long as demands are unmet and 
protests continue, people could make the decision to migrate in order to gain more reliable 
water access or an alternative livelihood. This movement could add more tension in the 
gaining communities, which are likely to be urban areas, if historical internal migration 
patterns continue. 
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However, so far, environmental migrants do not seem to be contributing much to 
conflict in Egypt’s urban areas. Urban violence is an issue in Egypt, but it is not strongly 
linked to environmentally-induced migration, partly because there is so little internal 
migration—let alone internal, environmentally-induced migration—in Egypt.187 Urban 
conflicts are instead primarily caused by poor governance, social inequality, and ineffective 
institutions.188 Over the past decade there has been a decrease in confidence in law 
enforcement and political classes in Egypt with increasing mobilization of broad sectors of 
the population against the government.189  
Some academics view climate change as an important variable in the lead up to the 
Arab Spring protests and ensuing government overthrow in Egypt. They argue that climate 
change helped to raise the cost of wheat prices globally due to production shortfalls, which 
then trickled down to increase the cost of staples like bread, despite subsidies.190 This 
dynamic may have contributed to the revolution. However, it did not contribute through 
the pathway of migration, as the rise in food prices did not cause migration prior to the 
protests and environmental migrants did not play a part in the revolution.  
H. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Water scarcity and climate change are challenges that Egypt must face, but they are 
not currently causing much internal migration. Without environmental issues causing 
migration, there can be no conflict caused as a result. However, this does not mean that 
environmental conflict potential is absent in Egypt. Climate change can put stress on 
society through decreased crop yields and lower water supplies that create scarcity, 
competition, and conflict without the intervening variable of migration. 
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III. THE CASE OF SUDAN 
“Almost invariably, we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political 
short-hand – an ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against black rebels and 
farmers. Look to its roots, though, and you discover a more complex 
dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict 
began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.”  
—Former U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon191 
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Sudan faces drastically different conditions internally from its northern neighbor 
Egypt. It has political, economic, social, ethnic, and environmental stressors. The people 
of Sudan have suffered from many problems in recent years with interlinked issues feeding 
periods of conflict, government incompetence and neglect, and environmental degradation. 
Despite international attention given to Sudan for the role of climate change in causing the 
conflict in Darfur and the continued focus on Sudan as a case study for environmental 
security analysis, this chapter sees climate change as just one of many issues facing the 
nation and conflict itself acting as a larger driver of population movement than 
environmental stress, scarcity, or climate change. 
This chapter begins with the current effects of climate change in Sudan to 
understand the environmental issues facing citizens and the state. Next, I analyze the 
existing types of migration and displacement to determine how climate change factors into 
this movement of people. Then, I look at conflict present in society from the second civil 
war, beginning in 1983, through the present day to understand what caused the fighting 
and whether migration from environmental scarcity drives this conflict. The analysis 
concludes that despite the many claims about the primacy of climate change causing 
migration and conflict in Sudan, government exploitation and negligence of peripheral 
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regions are the more concrete causes of conflict and that this has also made environmental 
degradation and the effects of climate change worse in Sudan. 
B. CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 
Sudan faces many challenges from climate change and these are only made worse 
by reliance on rainfed agriculture and underdeveloped state infrastructure. This creates 
structural food and water insecurity, particularly in the peripheral states.192 The most 
severe and pressing impacts of climate change in Sudan are increased rainfall variance, 
more severe and frequent droughts, and desertification. There are other less severe effects 
that will be addressed, namely less frequent Nile flooding, increased pest spread, and sea 
level rise in the Red Sea. With extreme regional climate variance, Sudan will be affected 
in different ways from climate change as the north is already desert, the south is rainy, and 
the center has four distinct season that encompass severe heat and dryness to a full rainy 
season.193  
Sudan is one of the driest, but most variable, countries in Africa in regards to 
rainfall; extremes in either direction are more common than average years.194 This is 
detrimental to the nation as it relies so heavily on rain for its farming and food security, 
particularly in rural areas where more than 65% of the population lives.195 The dangers of 
minimal rain are straightforward, but the complications that heavy rain brings are often not 
viewed with equal primacy. Above average rains can cause flash floods and soil 
waterlogging, destroy crops, and cause erosion particularly on large-scale agricultural 
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schemes.196 Additionally, Selby and Hoffman’s 2014 analysis of Sudan concluded that 
water abundance is a more important factor than scarcity in driving conflict.197 In eastern 
Sudan the rainfall is becoming more intense and variable with only 70 ml of rain in 2015 
followed by over 600 ml in 2016.198 Country-wide the nation is facing unpredictable rain, 
late harvests, and severe crop losses with 2019 seeing prolonged dry spells followed by 
intense rain in August.199 This delayed crop production and benefitted late season crops, 
but also helped to spread plant diseases, weeds, and pests.200 Climate models based on the 
national level predict higher rainfall going forward, but this can mask the increased 
frequency of droughts and flash floods that exist alongside the regional differences.201 As 
a nation so reliant upon consistent rainfall, Sudan faces challenges from the variable effect 
climate change brings. 
At the same time rainfall is becoming increasingly erratic, instances of drought have 
been increasing across Sudan and the surrounding Horn of Africa.202 From 1972 until 2008 
there were 16 droughts in Sudan, but from 2005 onward drought in the Horn has doubled 
from once every six years to once every three years.203 These recurrent droughts have 
become the norm in Sudan, with Darfur, Kordofan, and Gadarif being the most affected 
regions and Darfur facing the additional challenge of  an overall 30% decrease in rain over 
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the past three decades.204 As droughts have become more frequent, their impacts are 
aggravated by deforestation, land degradation, and excessive drain on the water supply 
resulting from expanded agricultural schemes.205 This had made the pain from droughts 
last longer and effects can carry on even longer when droughts are followed by flash floods, 
which are frequent occurrences in the transition to the rainy season.206 Temperatures are 
also rising with an average increase of .2-.4 degrees Celsius per decade since the 1960s. 
Combined with droughts and increased water demands, this has led to evaporation and the 
loss of almost half of the White Nile in southern Sudan.207 
Despite the overall abundance of water in the nation, notwithstanding seasonal 
variability, the state has been unable to provide for citizens as only 68% of the population 
has access to water services and farms continue to face deteriorating crop returns while the 
state fails to use its full annual allotment of water from the Nile.208 Unless crop production 
develops to account for the severity of drought, Sudan risks becoming trapped in a cycle 
of insecurity. This cycle could begin with the state being unable to provide enough food, 
food prices increase, farmers are unemployed and migrate to cities, and the government 
has their resources stretched even further while being unable to account for rising 
demand.209   
Coinciding with the regional decreases in rainfall and increased frequency of 
droughts, Sudan has seen spreading desertification and the loss of agricultural and range 
land from climate change. From the 1930s there has been a continued southward shift of 
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the semi-desert/desert northern border and this expansion has threatened pastoral and 
agricultural areas while also displacing people during droughts.210 In the north of Darfur, 
millions of hectares of land that had previously been semi-arid grazing land have become 
desert. Rangelands have also seen reduced variety and quantity of plants that are suitable 
for grazing.211 Desertification has not just affected Darfur, but also is present in Kordofan, 
Kassala, and Khartoum states.212 As grazing land diminishes from climate change and 
agricultural land expands because of government policies, water reserves have dwindled, 
land access has risen as a contentious issue, and food insecurity has spread; all factors that 
have caused an increase in citizen frustration.213 
Rain variance, flooding, and desertification may be the main challenges facing 
Sudan from climate change, but they are not the only ones. Sudan faces two types of flood 
challenges; torrential rain in the Ethiopian highlands that causes the Nile to overflow and 
locally heavy rainfall in the rainy season that causes flash floods.214 These are separate 
from the rising and falling of the Nile that allows silt to deposit on the farmland along the 
river and are more extensive issues. The annual Nile floods of this type have declined due 
to heat, evaporation, and upstream dam construction, but the more severe floods have 
slightly increased as there have been four severe floods since 1977, including one in 
September of 2020, with only two in the previous 100 years.215 This flooding has also 
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contributed to riverbank erosion that puts a further strain on farmers.216 Separate from 
flooding the large mechanized agricultural schemes often resort to boreholes to augment 
their water supply, but with more doing this the underground supply runs low and becomes 
excessively saline later in the dry season.217  
These issues with farming and floods have forced many farmers to shift to shorter 
cycle crops and plant later in the season.218 This in turn has led to higher pest, disease, and 
weed problems that make crops less productive and are only made worse by the high cost 
of pesticides and herbicides.219 All of east Africa has been facing challenges in 2019 and 
2020 from the spread of desert locusts, with optimal conditions created for their growth 
and spread from an excessively heavy rainy season. Challenges like this are only likely to 
continue as the climate becomes more variable and unpredictable. 
Finally, the prospect of sea level rise poses challenges for Sudan as one of its few 
large cities, and an important shipping center, lies along the coast of the Red Sea. Port 
Sudan is a vital outlet that connects the nation to the international market and their trade 
with Gulf countries, but much of the infrastructure is at sea level. As the government 
invests more in the business sector and migration increases for job opportunities in the city, 
it only makes it more vulnerable to sea level rise.220 The current level of rise has been 
slow, 10–20 cm over the last 100 years, but it is still occurring and a concern for the 
government that relies on the port.221 
C. MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT 
This section analyzes what causes people to move in Sudan and where they go. 
There are many factors that cause people to migrate or become displaced in Sudan with 
 
216 Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, 7.  
217 Ibrahim, “Rainwater Harvesting for Urban Areas,” 2733. 
218 FAO, 2019 FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan, 35. 
219 FAO, 2 and 27. 
220 Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development, Sudan’s Second National 
Communication Under the UNFCCC, 51. 
221 Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development, 45–46. 
 47 
conflict, government-induced displacement, government neglect, climate change, drought, 
seasonal migration, and refugee flows all accounting for the movement of over three 
million people, out of a national population of nearly 43 million, in 2019.222 While nearly 
2 million of the displaced live in camps in the Darfur states, the remaining third primarily 
move to cities.223 Migration is concentrated in the small number of cities in Sudan, 
primarily Khartoum, Port Sudan, and Nyala, where the displaced face challenges in 
accessing basic services, livelihoods, and land.224 Rural to urban migration has 
significantly increased urban poverty as the already limited government resources are 
overly strained.225 The value of land has increased with more people in cities, and the 
urban poor are being pushed out to slums and informal housing. As Khartoum houses half 
of the urban population and sits on the confluence of rivers, these informal settlements are 
also at increased risk for flooding and further displacement.226  
Sudan’s conflicts, including its civil wars and regional disputes in Darfur and the 
Two Areas, have created a large population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In the 
early 1990s, multiple IDP camps were created around Khartoum to house the displaced.227 
This policy shifted in the mid 1990s as the government claimed people were coming to the 
city just to profit off its generosity. It has since pushed IDPs into whatever housing they 
can find, often slums on the outskirts of the city.228 In Darfur, urban populations have 
increased from 20% in 2003 to over 50% in 2017 due mostly to the constant fighting and 
displacement. IDPs also make up as much as a quarter to one third of the population in 
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larger urban areas like Khartoum.229 This population growth is almost entirely the result 
of those displaced by conflict as the percentage of people living in urban areas hardly 
changed between the 1993 and 2008 censuses, going only from 29% to 30%.230 While 
many IDPs have moved to cities, there has also been a concurrent and much larger rise in 
the rural population that minimizes the influence of this rise in national percentages.  
Population displacement from internal conflict continues and serves as the biggest 
push factor to cities with regular attacks in conflict areas still occurring,.231 The 
government is partly responsible for the displacement of people through regional conflicts, 
but also displaces citizens as it takes land for agriculture and oil exploitation.232 Many 
farmers have had to abandon their traditional livelihoods after having their land taken and 
move to cities that are already overburdened. Their only other option would be to work on 
the large agricultural scheme that had displaced them from their farms.233 This dynamic, 
however, displaces far fewer citizens than violent conflicts.  
After conflicts, droughts and climate change are the second most important push 
factor driving migration in Sudan. Historically, severe droughts have been a prime mover 
of people. In the 1970s and 80s there was an extended Sahel drought that left farmers and 
pastoralists with no other options but to migrate as their crops failed and the water supply 
became scarce.234 During the second civil war (1983-2005), over 2 million people moved 
to Khartoum following severe reductions in agricultural productivity from drought coupled 
with the long-running civil war.235 This movement of people was not just to Khartoum but 
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also within peripheral states, like Darfur, where entire communities moved and contributed 
to long-term changes as people stayed in cities due to the deterioration of land quality.236  
The subsistence farmers that dominate farming in Sudan are greatly susceptible to 
the effects of drought and often lack any alternative if they are unable to grow their own 
food. The lack of other options and the increased frequency of droughts has continued to 
cause the displacement of Sudanese farmers to cities where they seek different livelihoods, 
particularly during droughts and dry seasons. These events have been more localized and 
less severe than the droughts of the 70s and 80s with less migration occurring as a direct 
result.237 Farmers have been able to change their crops to attempt to deal with dry seasons 
and avoid moving, while also diversifying their income through remittances and aid.238 
These fixes help with extended and harsher dry seasons, but a severe drought would still 
greatly impact farmers and pastoralists within Sudan and potentially cause them to migrate 
going forward. Estimates of increased drought frequency due to climate change will 
continue to pose risks that can cause migration into the future. As droughts worsen and the 
environment is more degraded, the displacement of people further damages the 
environment as cities expand and draw more on overtaxed water supplies.239  
In addition to farmers that migrate permanently to urban areas, Sudan has many 
farmers that migrate temporarily during the dry season. As an example, the regional 
farming village of Butana in Gadarif sees its population diminish annually during dry 
seasons from 72,000 to only 12,000 as farmers leave to seek opportunities in the city as 
their land becomes unproductive.240  Decreased crop efficiency and the increasing 
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unpredictability of the rainy seasons creates additional push factors for those reliant on 
farming to move temporarily to cities and diversify their income.241 
Another major movement of Sudanese citizens is driven by pastoralists. As a way 
of life, pastoralists seek pasturage in the south of the country during the dry season, 
typically November through April, while spending the rest of their time in the north. With 
climate change more strongly affecting Sudan, these movements are taking some 
pastoralists even further south into Kordofan where other seasonal migrants go. This has 
in turn raised issues over grazing and water rights.242 Southern Kordofan is also a major 
destination for those displaced by drought and war so the influx of seasonal pastoralists 
adds to the tensions in the region.243 The population influx into Kordofan has caused 
severe environmental degradation around major settlements and permanent water points 
that are used by the migrating groups and farmers. Local leaders are important in managing 
disputes in the area over these access issues but as pastoralists must go further to find viable 
pasturage, they will only come into further tension and conflict.244 As pastoralists make 
up almost 10% of the population, this is a large addition to people migrating partly from 
climate effects. 
The final piece involved in the movement of people in Sudan is refugees. While the 
IDPs make up a large part of movement, cross border flows from conflicts in South Sudan, 
Eritrea, the Central African Republic, and Syria make up over 1.1 million refugees in Sudan 
with over 70% living outside of camps.245 Many of these people live in undeveloped areas 
along the border, but over 120,000 live in Khartoum and further exacerbate the problems 
of service provision and food and water security.246 Sudan also serves as a transit country 
for refugees who are attempting to reach the Mediterranean coast and sail onwards to 
Europe. These transitory refugees add to the demands on services in cities while also 
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competing for jobs in the informal labor market while in the country.247 This flow of 
people adds to the tensions and potentials for conflict in Sudan as they join the millions 
more Sudanese citizens that are also moving inside the nation and reside in the overly 
populated urban areas where they draw on government services. 
There is a large and diverse flow of migrants in Sudan and these millions of people 
face intermixed challenges that have forced them to move. Climate change plays a part, 
but it ties in to longer standing issues like underdevelopment, poor resource allocation, and 
conflict that make direct causality arguments difficult. Those that move in response to 
decreases in crop productivity or water shortages are not directly moving because of 
climate change. However, the severity of weather conditions and unpredictable rains make 
their already dire situations worse and aid in their decision to migrate. Conflict directly 
moves a larger percentage, by at least a two to one ratio, but instances of severe drought 
and flooding have been increasing in Sudan and are likely to become more frequent and 
severe as a result of climate change. This will continue to drive migration, even if the 
regional conflicts are able to end. These more environmental driven migrants are not 
fleeing to IDP camps like the displaced but are moving to urban centers like Khartoum and 
Port Sudan. This movement is creating an increased demand on services while expanding 
informal housing settlements on the edges of the cities. Even if the government expands 
service provision and develops the peripheral regions that are the primary sending areas of 
these migrants, environmental factors are likely to continue to act as a push factor in Sudan. 
D. LARGE-SCALE INTERNAL CONFLICT   
Political challenges teem in Sudan and the situation is only made worse by the 
existence of long-term internal conflict. Since its independence from Egypt, Sudan has 
been beset by conflict; two long running civil wars that led to the secession of South Sudan, 
the uprising in Darfur, insurgency in the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile), as 
well as border disputes with Egypt and South Sudan for control of resource rich Abyei 
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Triangle and the 14-mile area. The continuation of these conflicts has diverted resources 
away from longer-term concerns of environmental change, land degradation, and food 
security while displacing millions.248  
There have been many explanations offered for the origins of these conflicts but, to 
put it mildly, they are complex and interconnected. A central cause of conflicts in Sudan is 
that its peripheral areas were underdeveloped by President Bashir as part of a policy where 
the Arab center and north of the country were privileged at their expense. These regions 
are both ethnically, religiously, and socially different than the ruling Arab elite in 
Khartoum and were exploited because of this and their rich natural resources.249 This toxic 
combination of religious differences, ethnic complexity, socio-economic disparities, 
political disenfranchisement, and resource exploitation has fueled anger in the regions, 
which have risen up in revolt against the central government.250 Adding the propensity for 
droughts in Sudan to the already poor water infrastructure, sources for grievance 
abound.251  
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) helped bring an end to the 
second civil war and allowed for South Sudan to gain its independence in 2011. 
Interestingly, while the CPA addressed many grievances the rebels had, water seemed to 
be a low priority relative to issues of borders, oil revenue sharing, and repatriation 
concerns.252 Meanwhile, the conflict in Darfur remains unsettled and the secession brought 
about renewed conflict in the Two Areas, bordering the newly created South Sudan, as 
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deep-seated economic and political disparities remained unresolved in the agreement.253 
The underlying issues of political and social marginalization were not addressed and new 
border regions were created that faced exploitation by the center, despite local elites calling 
for more control over state resources along with increased regional development.254  
Blue Nile and South Kordofan are both rich with grazing and agricultural land, Nile 
water, and mineral resources. As the government sought to control those resources while 
punishing citizens that had supported the southern rebels, conflict erupted and has remained 
active until today. These conflicts are therefore driven more by resource abundance and 
government exploitation than migration or resource scarcity.255 This conflict has also taken 
on an ethnic tinge as the central government would hire local militias as proxies and those 
militias were often rival ethnic groups.256 President Bashir also encouraged other ethnic 
groups to settle in the Two Areas in order to pressure the local population and gain access 
to the resources through a more friendly demographic.257  
Rather than causing these conflicts, population movements have been a result of 
fighting and food insecurities have resulted from the citizens being displaced from their 
land. Continuation of violence has made farming difficult as people are repeatedly driven 
off their land and unable to plant on time or harvest when crops are ready, with some 
citizens migrating to urban areas to avoid the conflict and access services.258 This issue 
has been exacerbated as droughts, floods, and the rainy season have intermingled with 
fighting to make farming an increasingly difficult endeavor in the region, with food scarcity 
resulting.259  
 
253 Adam O’Brien, Sudan’s Election Paradox, (Washington, DC: The Enough Project, 2009), 2, 
https://enoughproject.org/files/sudan_elections.pdf. 
254 Strachan, Rapid Fragility and Migration Assessment for Sudan, 9; Hassan, Spilling Over, 16. 
255 Khalid Ammar Hassan, Spilling Over: Conflict Dynamics in and Around Sudan’s Blue Nile State, 
2015–2019, ISBN 978–2-940548-80-4, (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2020), 12,  
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/reports/HSBA-Report-Sudan-Blue-Nile.pdf. 
256 Hassan, 9. 
257 Hassan, 15. 
258 Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (I), I and 27–29. 
259 Hassan, Spilling Over, 44. 
 54 
Separately, another regional conflict has raged within Sudan as Darfur has been 
fighting since February 2003 when two rebel groups challenged the central government.260 
This conflict has often been cited as climate change driven by academics and policy makers 
alike. The general argument goes that climate change caused drought and water scarcity 
that put pastoralists and farmers into conflict and this spiraled into a wider regional 
conflagration.261 However, other authors argue persuasively that the connections between 
climate change, migration, and conflict in the case of Darfur are weak and water scarcity 
is just one of the many elements at play.262 The rebels claim they are discriminated against 
based on their ethnicity, deprived of political power, and have had their resources 
exploited.263 These grievances have been exacerbated by local agro-pastoralist tension 
over water and grazing rights. However, the larger fight between the rebels and the central 
government resulted from government policies that failed to develop the region and 
exploited their resources to the benefit of Khartoum.264 As in the Two Areas, Khartoum 
also armed rival militia groups, the notorious Janjaweed, which added even more 
dimensions to the conflict as rival ethnic groups became activated.265  
As the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas have continued, and are being fought 
for similar reasons, there has been more cooperation under the umbrella of the Sudan 
Revolutionary Front (SRF) that is made up of various rebel groups. This organization has 
called for ending the marginalization of the peripheries and Khartoum’s exploitation of 
resources, services to be based on census populations and not patronage, and enhanced land 
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rights to help mitigate the effects of agro-pastoral violence.266 Some of the groups under 
the umbrella have also changed their initial demands of self-determination if the 
government is willing to comply with their demands and commit to a secular state.267 
Despite this unity, the government continues to treat the conflicts as local and believes that 
they should be managed separately, which has only aggravated the SRF and prevented a 
comprehensive peace deal from being instituted.268 Localized violence has flared up 
throughout Sudan this year, but with this fighting unable to affect the center, the violence 
has only perpetuated further conflict and discontent.269 Continued violence only serves to 
further degrade the environment, create more food insecurity, and make addressing the 
underlying tensions more difficult. 
Overall, long standing grievances brought about by underdevelopment and 
exploitation of the peripheral areas are serving as more direct causes of large scale conflict 
in Sudan. However, environmental degradation has continued to occur during, and partly 
as a result of, the fighting. People have moved away from their land because of warfare 
and reduced crop productivity. Migration has taken people away from conflict areas and 
has not been serving as a catalyst for violence. In this, the causal chain is reversed from 
what is expected in the literature as conflict is actually the variable driving migration and 
environmental degradation.  
E. FARMER-PASTORALIST TENSIONS 
In addition to its large-scale internal conflicts, Sudan experiences lower levels of 
violence as farmers and pastoralists frequently come into conflict as they compete over 
land and water rights. Pastoralist herders, making up roughly 10% of the population, have 
a long history in Sudan, as they developed seasonal migration practices to account for 
resource availability, with the effects of climate change making this method all the more 
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useful, if challenging.270 A major problem affecting this group is the expansion of 
mechanized agriculture that has restricted their migratory paths, deprived them of seasonal 
grazing areas, and curtailed their water access.271 Mechanized farming has expanded to 
over 6.7 million hectares in the south and east of the country in an effort to produce more 
food for domestic consumption.272 This expansion has led to the clearing of natural 
vegetation and forests, which has restricted pastoralist access to resources for their 
herds.273  
Until the mid 1980s, the government had instituted dates when harvest must be 
complete, so pastoralist herds could graze on the land afterwards, but these policies were 
removed and farmers are now able to restrict pastoralists from their land and charge for 
access.274 This has occurred as climate change is increasing the frequency of droughts and 
driving pastoralists to increasingly diminished areas to feed and water their herds. 
Pastoralists are having to travel further in order to feed their herds and diminishing grazing 
areas are then having to support a larger number of herds. Migration continues to be 
seasonal, but pastoralists are forced to travel further than ever before. This is putting more 
people in contact with each other in the search of diminishing resources. In this case, 
expanded migration is not caused by climate change as much as government policies that 
allowed for expansion of farming into traditional grazing areas.  
 
270 Madeline Vellturo, “The Erosion of Pastoralism in the Sudano Sahel: Time to Recognize a 
Growing Security Threat?,” Stimson Center, 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/the-erosion-of-
pastoralism-in-the-sudano-sahel/; Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical Development, Sudan’s 
Second National Communication Under the UNFCCC, 3. 
271 Sulieman and Elagib, “Implications of Climate, Land-Use and Land-Cover Changes for 
Pastoralism in Eastern Sudan,” 133; East Africa and the Horn in 2022: An Outlook for Strategic 
Positioning in the Region, (Inter-Agency Regional Analysts Network, 2017), 5,  https://www.iris-
france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IARAN-East-Africa-to-2022-revised.pdf. 
272 FAO, 2019 FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Sudan, 12; Mahgoub, Current 
Status of Agriculture and Future Challenges in Sudan, 12; Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Physical 
Development, Sudan’s Second National Communication Under the UNFCCC, 6. 
273 Sulieman and Elagib, “Implications of Climate, Land-Use and Land-Cover Changes for 
Pastoralism in Eastern Sudan,” 133; Hussein Sulieman and Abdel Ghaffar Ahmed, “Mapping the Pastoral 
Migratory Patterns Under Land Appropriation in East Sudan: The Case of the Lahaween Ethnic Group,” 
The Geographic Journal (May 2016): 386, https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12175. 
274 Sulieman, and Ahmed, 391; FAO, 2019 FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the 
Sudan, 12. 
 57 
Climate change is playing a part in forcing the pastoralists to travel further as 
grazing areas face rainfall variance and droughts that causes them to be less efficient, 
despite not being the primary factor. Concurrently, farmers gain control of more land and 
pastoralists are deprived as a result creating tensions between the groups. Clashes between 
them are common with many state governments setting up committees to resolve disputes 
as conflicts have erupted in Blue Nile, Sennar, North Kordofan, and White Nile states.275 
These clashes are often seasonally based as pastoralists bring their herds south through 
increasingly narrow transit corridors with larger herds being met with diminished resource 
access.276 These increasingly commonplace conflicts have frequently been politicized and 
framed as ethnic tensions that the central government cannot manage rather than as conflict 
over diminishing resources and poor allocation.277 The fighting between pastoralists and 
farmers is the best example of climate change influencing migration and that migration 
causing conflict as groups battle over finite resources, despite not reaching the scale or 
severity of the regional conflicts. 
F. URBAN CONFLICT AND THE 2019 GOVERNMENT TRANSITION 
The overall role of environmental migration on conflict may be limited, but it is 
likely that it played a partial factor in the 2019 protests and overthrow of the Bashir regime. 
The secession of South Sudan and presence of long running conflicts severely restricted 
government capacity to provide services while migrants continued to move to cities 
seeking reliable access to those same services. Seeking to cut spending, the state reduced 
subsidies, which caused a rise in bread and fuel prices nationwide with the highest prices 
pushed to the peripheral regions to try and avoid unrest in Khartoum.278 Shortages had 
occurred in addition to the price increases and the state was unable to meet citizen 
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demand.279 Demonstrations started in the capital of Blue Nile state in 2018 and spread 
throughout the nation, with the largest in Khartoum where the population was 
concentrated.280  While not a direct line to environmental migration, far from it, as the 
Bashir regime sought to prioritize the needs of Khartoum he deprived the peripheral 
regions, which made them more susceptible to environmental degradation. As citizens 
moved to cities, it increased the resources the state needed to supply to maintain stability. 
Many factors led to the revolution and ensuing government overthrow, but the increased 
demand brought about by migration is likely to have played a contributing factor. The 
successful overthrow could be acting as a potential intervening variable that prevented 
migration from leading to conflict in Khartoum and allowed for the conflict to remain in 
the peripheral regions. However, this outlet only works if the transitional regime is able to 
provide for the citizens as the Bashir regime did not. 
G. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Migration in Sudan has many intertwined causes, with conflict and drought acting 
as the two largest push factors for displacement. Dry seasons and drought push people off 
their land yearly and in much larger quantities during severe droughts. Droughts make 
farming less efficient and forces people to move to urban centers in search of alternative 
livelihoods and access to food, water, and services. Some people move because of food 
and water scarcity, but that scarcity is caused by climate change acting in conjunction with 
other factors. Migrants are not just environmental but also economic as they flee war for a 
better life in Khartoum. Some of this movement is permanent, but often these migrants 
tend to go back to their land once rain returns in an attempt to continue farming. However, 
conflict remains the more important variable in causing the flow of people acting as the 
source of more than two thirds of the total movement in Sudan during 2019. 
Environmental migration has limited impact on conflict in Sudan. The civil wars 
and large regional conflicts have centered around grievances against the national 
government that has exploited and underdeveloped the conflict-riven peripheral regions. 
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Migrants are present, but they are the result of the fighting and not the cause. 
Environmental migration is more of a factor in farmer-pastoralist tensions but this 
migration is also influenced by government policies that have allowed farmers to keep 
pastoralists off grazing land. Pastoralists have had to travel farther to reach diminished and 
less productive grazing land and come into conflict with farmers seasonally. Despite this, 
the fighting is at a low level relative to the large scale regional fighting that is not shaped 
by migration. Migration also played a contributing factor in the 2019 revolution as the 
presence of migrants in urban areas allowed for even more widespread demonstrations 
against unmet citizen demands. 
With an uncertain future for the transitional government there is still a potential for 
climate change to continue adding stress on a nation overburdened with issues. If the state 
is unable to provide reliable food, water, and housing to its citizens there is potential for 
further protests. If citizens rise up again there is a chance for more direct involvement of 
environmental issues in causing conflict in Sudan. Migration may not need to act as an 
intervening variable if the government does not increase service provisions and stop the 
privileging of the center at the expense of peripheral regions, regions that are the most 
negatively affected by climate change. Until that possibility, migration in Sudan is not 
directly caused by climate change but through the confluence of other factors that climate 
change adds to and conflict is not directly caused by migration as it remains in the 
periphery.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For years scholars have been looking at environmental degradation and climate 
change as possible drivers of migration and conflict. It seems everyone is producing an 
estimate on the severity of the climate change threat and the follow-on movement of people 
that it will cause, but these prognostications are often tilted in a negative and alarmist 
manner. This has made the problem seem nearly beyond the scope of government action. 
So far the worst of the predications has not occurred, but climate change remains present 
in scholarly and political debate, with more focus on it as time has progressed. As 
international attempts to reduce greenhouse gas have proven inadequate and arctic ice 
shelves continue to melt at accelerated rates, there is still time to address climate change—
but also time for the dour estimates to become reality.  
To determine how climate change has affected migration and conflict, this thesis 
looked at its effects in Egypt and Sudan. In both cases climate change is present, but it 
grafts on to already complex societies facing multiple issues. Egypt, with excessive 
reliance on the Nile, a growing population, increasingly inefficient farming, and a budding 
dispute over Nile control with Ethiopia, can ill afford to deal with the challenges climate 
change brings. Despite these myriad issues, migration from environmental degradation has 
been limited in Egypt due to extreme population density and urban areas already 
overburdened with a growing youth bulge. Scholars propose that technological and market 
solutions can prevent migration. But Egypt has engaged in neither, yet migration has still 
been minimal. Conflict there is generally unrelated to environmental issues. 
In Sudan, conflict and migration have been present since the start of the country, 
with constant civil wars and regional disputes displacing millions. This is in addition to the 
droughts that have also forced people off their land. The conflicts are so multifaceted and 
complex that to reduce them down to climate change, as some attempted with Darfur, is to 
oversimplify purely for argument sake. Such a simplification also shifts the focus to climate 
change, and not socio-political issues that climate change interacts with. It appears that 
climate change is a factor in driving migration in Sudan but it is secondary to conflict 
causing movement. Climate change is ruining agricultural land, pushing pastoralists further 
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from their traditional grazing lands, and forcing people to move, but conflict is also doing 
this and to a much larger degree. Even when environmental migration is present it is not 
directly causing conflict, except in small levels with farmer and pastoralist violence. The 
large scale conflict that has occurred in Sudan is caused more by grievances from political 
exploitation than any other factor. While conflict is not being caused by environmental 
migrants, climate change still is adding stress on the state. 
Climate change does not occur in a vacuum. It takes place in states that all have 
their individual issues and challenges shaped by the political and economic situations 
present in the nation. As such, there is no one-size-fits-all answer on the nexus of climate 
change, migration, and conflict. If the conditions are right climate change can make 
migration more likely as has happened in Sudan. If there are limited places to go internally 
like in Egypt, migration can not be an adaptation technique. Conflict can take place when 
people move from environmental stress, but this is most likely when there are already 
underlying issues present in society that are made worse by this movement of people. 
Theories on the linkages are good places to begin analysis, but to truly understand how 
climate change will shape a nation one must look specifically at that state and determine 
the underlying conditions that will be made worse. Making a theory too specific prevents 
its general applicability, and undermines its usefulness, but any general theory on climate 
change causing migration and conflict is liable to fail due to the unique situations within 
states.  
So where does this leave us? Does climate change cause migration? It can and will 
continue to do so in some cases but not others. Does climate change-induced migration 
cause conflict? It can add to the grievances that help create conflict but as a sole variable 
it appears unlikely to do so. In the case of Sudan is just one of the many factors that 
continues to drive conflict. Despite this murky linkage, any action done to mitigate the 
severity of climate change will be worthwhile for governments to pursue. If climate change 
does negatively impact some nations, then working to solve the issue on the front end will 
require fewer resources than doing it after conflict has started. Mitigation is an area where 
a little effort now can prevent a lot of effort down the road. The most severe effects of 
climate change have been forecasted to hit the developing world and as climate change 
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worsens, the United States is beginning its shift to a position of Great Power Competition. 
Focusing on potential near-peer competitors seems like a reasonable thing to do, but 
discounting climate change and the negative impacts that it can bring across the developing 
world will make future problems and destabilizing actions all the worse. Action taken now 
will help to mitigate the effects on these nations, build relationships, and prevent these 
issues from being overlooked in the face of more traditional security threats. Just because 
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